Do all living things have moral value?

Environmental ethics is an academic field that emerged in the 1960s which provoked research in to understanding the humans’ moral obligations towards the non- anthropocentric natural world including animals, plants and land. However, there has been ongoing debates onto whether it is the ecological whole or the individual parts that has an intrinsic value. For example, is it the forest as a form of a network, or the singular tree that has an inherent worth? The traditional way of looking at ethics has adopted a human-centered approach where humans have dominated nature while nature is being seen as instrumental in so much as it supports the human survival. The “last man” thought experiment as articulated by Routley in 1973 describes a scenario where the last man on earth is torching the remaining bacteria and plants, leaving no possibility for life to continue in his absence. Commonly, this picture creates a depiction that seems to be morally deficient and destructive, opening up the question as to whether nature has intrinsic value and moral worth in its own right, regardless of being useful to humans. Accordingly, three theories have sought to provide a framework for understanding environmental ethics; holism, pluralism and biocentric individualism. In this essay, I argue in support of Callicott’s pluralism. First, I will introduce Leopold’s “spheres of moral considerability”. Second, I contrast purism with pluralism, and the problem of “eco-fascism” in regards to purism will be noted. Third, I contrast biocentric individualism with pluralism, and name the advantages to pluralism. Fourth, I put forward two objections to pluralism, which will be responded to. Finally, I will conclude in support of pluralism.

Leopold’s “spheres of moral considerability” is a diagram that provides a representation of the development of environmental ethics and consists of a number of circles within one another, with individualism at the centre, as the circles widen to finally include holism. At the centre is orthodox anthropocentrism, where “moral obligations extend only to other humans”, a view held by Descartes and by Kant. Although Kant believed that one’s poor treatment of animals could be a precursor to treating fellow humans badly. The next circle is hierarchical biocentrism, where moral considerability is extended “to grant intrinsic value to all living things in the natural order”, with humans at the top, therefore holding the greatest intrinsic value at this point. This view is held by Rolston and Ferre. Beyond this, is psychocentrism that is inclusive of animal liberation and animal rights and philosopher Regan refers to animals as “subjects of a life” which secure intrinsic value in and of themselves and Singer refers to “sentient beings” who have desires. The following circle stands for egalitarian biocentrism, purported by Taylor, who believed in “goal directed activity” as living things fulfill their goals and hold inherent worth. Finally, holism extends moral worth to ecological wholes and the standpoint is held by Callicott and Leopold (Keller, 2010 : 10-16).

Pure holists claim ecological wholes such as species, ecosystems and land have intrinsic and moral value. This claim means the wholes matter as an end in themselves, such as a marine ecosystem off the coast, a network of trees, or species of animal. For the holist, the main focus is on the network, as opposed to the individual parts. Leopold put forward a position of “pure holism” within his land ethic, in which he considers the biosphere, or rather the earth’s entire ecosystem, to have an intrinsic value, including humans, animals, soils, waters, the air, plants, and mountains. Leopold suggests that ecosystems are interdependent thus maintaining complex relationships, which humans are not able to fully understand. Therefore in turn, he believed we humans are obligated to preserve the land as far as we can rather than interfering with it. He asserts it as “inconceivable” to relate ethically to the land without “love, respect and admiration” as well as with “a high regard for its value” (Leopold, 1960 : 200) while conceding that “land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants and animals" (Leopold, 1960 : 197). In reference to his reverence for the networks and as well as his view that we humans cannot fully comprehend the complexities of nature, Leopold put the land or “biotic community” ahead of the individual parts, stating "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise". Accordingly, individual parts have instrumental value insofar as they should protect the land. This has the implication that if a species of animal was doing harm to the land, Leopold would have no issue with culling the species, which is a view felt to be extreme by those with an individualistic approach, as I will discuss as a criticism of purism later. Leopold was concerned that “the most serious obstacle” inhibiting the development of a land ethic is that “our educational and economic system is headed away from [...] an intense consciousness of land” (Leopold, 1960 : 200). One can infer that the reason for his seemingly radical philosophy was due to his felt requirement that humans thinking was in need of drastic transformation to preserve the integrity of the land.

Comparatively, pluralism is the position put forward by Callicott, who developed Leopold’s land ethic further by exploring and defending the essence of the latter’s theory. Pluralism proposes that the intrinsic value lies not only within the biosphere, but also in the individual parts. The supposition relies on three scientific outlooks. The first is on Darwin’s evolution that relates humans to the whole of nature. Second is on ecology that demonstrates the human interconnectedness with the environment; and lastly, astronomy, which fundamentally joins the human’s fate with all other forms of life. In reference to the maxim cited from Leopold as noted at the end of the previous paragraph, Callicott provides a reason as to why this rule exists by drawing upon Humean philosophy, where sentiments, such as human feelings and emotions, such as benevolence, provide humans with a sense of morality, resulting in an ability to sympathise with both individuals and wholes. He concedes that “our moral sentiments can move back and forth between holistic and individualistic objects” and that through natural selection, humans have developed the aptitude to do so (Ouderkirk, 2002 : 101). Callicott invites one to move “in imagination, outwardly from the core of one’s organism” in order to find that “the world is [...] one’s extended body” which he relates back to Heraclitus in Ancient Greece who said, “for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return”. This mode of thought is in line with Goodpaster’s “relational view of self, as bodily organism and self as conscious [...] transforms egoism into environmentalism” (Keller, 2010 : 406). Being a part of nature reflexively means to be a part of the biotic community, as opposed to numerous individualistic parts, and therefore, obligations arise due to interconnectedness with this community. Callicott introduces this holistic position as a form of projectivism, insofar as humans project internal values on to external things. Consequently, the natural world can hold intrinsic value, as long as we value it in its own right. Callicott acknowledges non-human nature to have a weaker intrinsic value in the sense that things have worth for themselves but not in themselves. However, his goal is to transform the way of thinking away from nature as merely instrumental and towards a spirit of protecting and respecting nature, as citizens of the community. Callicott includes the principle within his theory that human communities take priority over the natural world, called “second order” consumers, including herbivorous and carnivorous animals respectively. Of the first-order are producers; the green plants and lastly, decomposers including fungi and bacteria. Therefore, he identified stronger and weaker interests, which removes the concern of eco-fascism, that will be discussed in the following paragraph in relation to purism.

A criticism of the pure holist view of Leopold, comes from an animal activist, Tom Regan who regards animals as “the subjects of a life” that have “inherent value” in the same way that he suggests humans do (Keller, 2010 : 167). The accusation he makes is of “eco-fascism”, a totalitarian regime where individuals parts must be sacrificed for the greater good of the whole. The land ethic theory discounts the value of individuals, including humans and animals, by stating they possess value only when they contribute to the ecological whole. For the individualist, the prime importance lies within the interests of sentient beings such as animals or living things such as individual plants, and the criticism provides a stark contrast with Leopold’s view that humans have a duty to kill animals if they threaten the biotic community. For the holist, this is about population control and preservation of the land. However, for Regan, the biosphere and ecosystems don’t have moral standing, resulting in this type of culling being likened to murder. He refers to the “fundamental wrong” of viewing animals as “our resources” and the mistreatment of animals alike to “racism” or “speciesism” where the interests of others matter “only if they happen to be members of his own species” (Keller, 2010 : 161-162). He expresses a “moral obligation to act on their behalf” as the animals “cannot speak out on their own behalf”. The opposing views of holism and individualism are so far apart that an agreement could never be reached as to where intrinsic value is found. In response, Regan has been accused of zoo-centrism or being too centered upon the interests of animals, without consideration for other living beings not within this circle of interest.

The final position is the biocentric individualist, for whom the intrinsic value lies within the individual living things, whereas the holistic entities have instrumental value. Gary Varner originally proposed this utilitarian position, based on the fact that all living things have biological interests to serve a biological function. The continued well- being of an organism is best understood as it having interests, rather than desires, and as all living things have an interest in well-being, they are therefore morally considerable. Plants have an interest to seek sunlight and water although they are not consciously aware of it in the same way as a sentient being, that has desires. Varner proposes a hierarchy of interests with biological interests as the least important as applicable to plants, desire-based interests in relation to animals (not including fish) to be of greater worth and ‘ground projects’ (a collection of projects which give meaning to one’s life), applicable to humans and these are which hold the most value. Varner argues that animals do not have the sense of self which humans do, but as they possess consciousness, they are ranked higher than plants. Varner’s stance followed that of Paul Taylor, who argues that living things are teleological centres of a life, that have a good or an end (teleos) of their own, that can be harmed or enhanced, and in that sense they have interests. It is true for Taylor that “trees can be harmed or benefitted by our actions” and the act of cutting down trees would stop the parts from achieving their goal of flourishing and growth, therefore obstructing their interests. Taylor suggests that:

Our duties to respect the integrity of natural ecosystems [...] preserve endangered species [...] avoid environmental pollution stem from the fact that these are ways in which we can help make it possible for wild species populations to achieve and maintain a healthy existence in a natural state (Keller, 2010 : 176).

He goes on to say that these obligations are there due to the recognition of the inherent worth of the individual parts. Whilst he talks about the “complex web of interconnected elements”, it is the “teleological centre of life, pursuing its own good in its own way” which holds the intrinsic value. Whilst there is reverence for the whole of nature, it is merely instrumental (Keller, 2010 : 178). In terms of the advantages to pluralism, the most prominent is that the stance gives us the opportunity to value both the networks and the individual living things, providing a holistic view of nature, insofar as we can appreciate that individual living things cannot flourish without a supportive network. I would extend this to say that even human beings who are considered intrinsically valuable in their own right, have a network of other human beings supporting them in some form, which enables them to flourish and develop, so we can draw a parallel between nature and ourselves.

In the 1990s, ecologist Suzanne Simard researched how trees develop a symbiotic relationship with the network of fungi beneath the soil, which communicate using thin threads, known as a mycelium. The threads act like the internet, sending signals, nutrients and information between different trees, referred to as the “wood wide web”. Simard is concerned that clear-cutting of trees and climate change could damage the vital networks, and without the networks, the individual trees are at risk. It is clear that the network is what gives rise to the individuals and so the position of pluralism placing intrinsic value upon both wholes and individual parts makes for an integrative and interconnected theory which places reverence for all of nature at the centre. For the individualist, who finds that the ecological wholes are only of instrumental importance, there is an anthropocentric focus which could be replaced with an amalgamation of both the whole and the parts, therefore not losing the value placed on the individuals. In addition, pluralism provides an opportunity to re-visit how we look at intrinsic and instrumental value. As a development of the above point, intrinsic value could be assigned to both the wholes and the parts but as with Callicott’s theory, with a kind of order or principle based system, so that decisions can be made when problems arise to do with managing the environment.

The first criticism of pluralism comes from Partridge, who agrees that an environmental ethic “cannot stand without a theory of sentiments”, but he disagrees that Hume’s philosophy is adequate to support Callicott’s view. The reason is that he believes that “Humean moral sentiments are more likely to reinforce anthropocentrism and alienate humans from nature” (Ouderkirk, 2002 : 21). Partridge asserts that in order to work, the sentiments must be “nonmoral”, unlike benevolence and sympathy, and therefore not related to personhood in others. In response to Partridges’ criticism regarding the relationship with Hume’s philosophy, Callicott replies, “a theory of moral sentiments provides a moral psychology that makes ethics a matter of the heart as well as the head [...] of feeling as well as reason”. He relates his rationale back to his scientific basis for his theory that, “moral psychology is essential for an evolutionary account of the origin and development of ethics, as Darwin clearly recognised”. He argues that he did not mean to interpret all of Hume’s philosophy but instead to ground the land ethic in the “general approach to ethics that Hume pioneered” (Ouderkirk, 2002 : 293). It is apparent that Callicott is attempting to change the worldview of environmental ethics and provide an emotive as well as rational sense of morality towards the environment, and one has to consider whether this is what is needed in order to regain our sense of connection with the earth.

The second criticism of pluralism is relating to Callicott’s emphasis on community and interdependence, which “seems too strong a word for our role in ecosystems”, as we do not have a high level of mutual exchange with the earth and seem “genuinely superfluous to ecosystemic functioning”. Therefore, “mutuality, a necessary constituent of community, is missing”, which means that there is no community and only self interest (Ouderkirk, 2002 : 6). In response to this second criticism, despite the fact humans are considered superfluous to the functioning of the ecosystem, there is more which could be done in terms of human contribution and in addition, far less destruction ought to be done. Therefore, if humans cannot contribute to the ecosystem, they should at least minimise the damage by appreciating the biotic community and making a unique contribution as far as possible. As Leopold states in his land ethic, humans are not fully aware of the nature of the biotic community and the complexity of the relationships within it and therefore, deep thought and reverence ought to be placed upon the earth so that humans may continue to transform their thinking to consider themselves a part of the community, as this will give them a stronger capability to have awareness of the intrinsic link between humans and nature.

In conclusion, I argue in support pluralism as it offers a holistic world-view for humans present and future treatment of the environment. Within the view, there is a deep respect towards the complex systems that existed long before humans were in existence. With this view, one can see humankinds place as a preserver of the land, and a citizen of the earth, whose contribution to the ecosystems can be to protect the land and the individual parts as far as is possible. Callicott’s pluralism appeals to the moral sentiment of benevolence, facilitating humans in developing a sympathetic attitude to the networks, which give rise to the individual parts, as well as having the awareness that the many separate create the whole and therefore they are intrinsically linked. By humans integrating moral psychology and combining what is in their hearts and our heads, pluralism can be a way of revering all of life with the love, respect and admiration Leopold spoke of. As Callicott included principles to include human communities having priority over the natural world, he cannot be accused of eco-fascism as Leopold was and has appealed to anthropocentric concerns whilst embracing the integrity of the land.

Bibliography

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Varner, Gary E.. 2001, In Nature's Interests? : Interests, Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics, [ebook], Oxford University Press
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