“Where does the mind stop and the world begin?” (Clark and Chalmers)

Clark and Chalmers (C & C), “The Extended Mind” (EM), is an exploration in to the field of extended cognition. Their theory, active externalism, relates to how cognition can extend beyond the confines of the skull and is, “based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998 : 48). They are clear that it is not consciousness that extends beyond the skull, but that “the meaning of our words just ain’t in the head” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998 : 48). Furthermore, the argument for active externalism is that there isn’t a distinction between the mind, body and environment in the way that internalism argues for, and it differs from Putnam’s traditional content externalism. They posited that the mind and environment act as a coupled system, and therefore create a complete system. In this essay, I will argue in support of their theory, that it is possible for cognition to extend beyond the mind, through notebooks and various technologies. Firstly, I will explain the Otto and Inga thought experiment and active externalism. Then, I’ll explain the system of causal coupling and how the parity principle aids in incorporating the functionalist theory of mind in to EM. Furthermore, I’ll discuss embodied cognition and its connections with modern science, that links mind and body inextricably. I’ll explore an argument against EM and respond accordingly. Finally, I’ll conclude that external tools do aid in cognitive processing, and that in this way the mind can be extended beyond the confines of the skull.

The Otto and Inga thought experiment describes two people finding directions to a museum. Otto has Alzheimer’s Disease and uses written directions from his trusted, frequently used notebook. He has a belief that he has written down the correct route, and this can be thought of as an extension of his cognition. Inga relies on her memory, holding a belief that she remembers the correct route, knowing she can bring it to consciousness as and when required. C & C are claiming that Otto’s notebook plays the same role as Inga’s biological memory. What makes information count as a belief here is the role that it plays, whether it is inside the mind or not, meaning “there is nothing sacred about skull and skin” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998 : 58). C & C refer to a belief for “folk psychological purposes” by treating the notebook entries “as part of the mechanical supervenience base for his standing beliefs”. (Clark, 2011 : 451). This is active externalism, that shows how mind, body and environment can possibly interact, and determine someone’s future behaviour. It is not like the more passive content externalism that is to do with historical beliefs “at the other end of a lengthy causal chain” (Menary et al, 2010 : 29). In comparison, active externalism is not dependent on history, and instead focuses on the connection between mind and environment through epistemic actions in the here and now, where the coupled system has “a direct impact on the organism and on its behaviour” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998 : 51).

This coupled system is a “two way interaction” between external objects and the mind-body, called “causal coupling” or “continuous reciprocal coupling”. This is referred to as a complete cognitive system of its own, where “all the components in the system play an active causal role”. If the external component were to be removed, such as Otto’s notebook, “the system’s behavioural competence will drop” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998 : 50). Symmetric influence occurs when the inner and outer constitutive functions have a causal connection in the here and now and can determine future behaviour, such as arriving at the museum on time. Furthermore, the notebook can be regarded as part of the cognitive functioning of the brain, rather than just a prompt. As well as written information, symbols and spoken language, “appears to be a central means by which cognitive processes are extended into the world”. (Menary et al, 2010 : 31). C & C consider “a group of people brainstorming around a table, or a philosopher who thinks best by writing, developing her ideas as she goes” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998 : 54). It follows that social and cultural development occurs when one mind extends outwards to another, sharing ideas for growth and enculturation. To support the theory that cognition can be extended, C & C introduced the Parity Principle (PP), that also helps address internalist concerns that what happens internally cannot be replicated externally.

The PP says that if we can look at a process happening outside of the mind that could be described as a cognitive task if it had happened inside a mind, we should call it a cognitive process. Crucially, this principle is “a plea for equality of opportunity rather than equality of mechanistic contribution” (Clark, 2011 : 451). This combats the internalist criticism from Adams and Aizawa that external processes cannot be identical to internal ones, because they aren’t intended as such here. Later in the essay I will explore this as a criticism more fully. The PP exists within this argument for two reasons. One is to put aside Cartesian ideas of a clear distinction between body, mind and environment and shows the key role of environment in cognitive processing. Second, it introduces the functionalist view of EM in that as long as a process has a cognitive function, it doesn’t matter whether it happens in the mind or not. If it is part of a system that enables a person to carry out a cognitive task, it is therefore causally integrated with other cognitive processes. The PP highlights the functionality of a process rather than comparing whether an external cognitive process is identical to an internal one.

Above all, EM is consistent with the functionalist theory of mind. What is important in this theory, is how the mind is used alongside the body and environment to determine and enhance desired behaviour and outcomes. Humans use notepads, iphones, diaries and train timetables in a coupled system constantly (Menary et al, 2010 : 32). The functional role of a belief plays a crucial part, as these examples of trusted external props are relied upon for a desired outcome and determine how things can be done in the world. The strength of this argument is that is demonstrates clearly the ethical merits of understanding that external processes can be an extension of the mind for people who truly rely on this support to help them function in their lives. Those with impaired brain function may keep detailed notes as a trustworthy reminder of having taken medication, and if this were to be taken away, their cognitive functioning would be impaired, as well as their mental, emotional and physical wellbeing. Not recognising this would be prejudice against the importance of external support and the many ways humans already rely on it for enhancement of daily life in the present moment. Furthermore, the theory is closely linked to embodied cognition, that discusses how cognition is integrated with the physical body, so deeply that the body plays a causal role or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing. 

The Embodiment Thesis attempts to “specify the nature of the dependence of cognition on the body” and in particular what “causal or physically constitutive roles” the body plays in cognition (Wilson & Foglia : 2015). Wilson attempts to connect embodied and extended cognition in respect of visual processing with the following argument:

“1. The function of some visual processes is to guide action via visual information.

2. A primary way to achieve that function is through the active embodiment of visual processing (in a fairly strong sense).

3. Visual processes are actively embodied (in that same fairly strong sense) just if in their normal operation in natural environments, these processes are coupled with bodily activities so as to form an integrated system with functional gain.

4. Visual processes that are actively embodied, in this sense, are also extended.

5. Some visual processes, and the visual systems those processes physically constitute, are extended” (Wilson, 2010 : 14).

This argument supports integrative coupling that the EM thesis describes, in terms of the connection between mind, body and environment. The embodied view of visual processing is that it functions “via boundary-crossing feedback mechanisms that link perception to action” (Wilson, 2010 : 12). This is where the body is a distributer, in that bodily functions transmit computational and representational data between the brain (neural structures) and non neural (the body and its actions). “This use of the body, this body-in-action, creates and stabilizes a chain of representations tied directly to actions” (Wilson, 2010 : 13). Furthermore, in other research on the mind-body connection, neuroscientist Damasio found that “the body and the brain form an integrated organism and interact fully and mutually via chemical and neural pathways” (Damasio, 2003 : 194). In Looking for Spinoza, he recites the experience with one of his patients, who suffered from seizures. He reported a sensation that would begin in his stomach upwards to his chest, leading to a feeling of numbness. This feeling would continue to rise and once reaching his throat, he would lose consciousness. He would then experience convulsions, and minutes later, return to normal. This was significant to Damasio because it showed “when the ongoing brain mapping of the body was suspended, so way the mind”. In other words, “removing the mental presence of the body was like pulling the rug from under the mind” (Damasio, 2003 : 192). Ultimately, body, brain and mind are a “well woven apparatus” that are “inseparable under normal operating circumstances” (Damasio, 2003 : 194).

Arguments against EM are from Adams and Aizawa and relate to reliability, portability and coupling concerns. The issues raised are that cognitive processes should be portable and that coupled systems are too easily decoupled. If Otto’s notebook were to be removed, the argument no longer works. However, Clark responds that the same could apply to the brain, as “the biological brain is in similar danger, and occasionally loses capacities temporarily in episodes of sleep, intoxication, and emotion”. This highlights that there should not be prejudice towards internal brain functioning only, but that external processes should too be held as relevant and valuable. “If the resources of my calculator or my Filofax are always there when I need them, then they are coupled with me as reliably as we need” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998 : 54). People often use their fingers to count with and this extends to pocket calculators and rulers, to improve clarity and accuracy. In summary, the notebook isn’t meant to become cognitive but is meant to create functionality. This supports the ethical understanding of EM, that someone with impaired brain functioning can use external support as part of a coupled system to enhance cognitive processing, and the importance of this should be raised higher through application of EM.

In conclusion, the ethical understanding leads to a sympathetic view of EM, in that it would be immoral and perhaps lacking in common sense to say that the notebook of someone with impaired memory function is not a crucial part of the user’s life. Furthermore, it is clear that the information stored within does function as a belief and is reliable and portable, in a similar way to information in the mind. The PP reminds us that this is a theory of functionalism and this should act to redirect critics away from the concern that external processes can never be cognitive. Certainly, the external tools could be removed and impair cognitive processing but, so too could the brain be impaired fin the case of intoxication or heightened emotion. The vitality of EM is represented in its usage in the here and now, and in its embodied interweaving of mind, body and action to create desired results. The argument highlights how much we already rely on external data for our processing, such as train timetables, and penning thoughts in the case of the philosopher who thinks best when writing and developing ideas. Damasio crucially highlights that body, brain and mind are a well woven apparatus and C & C stand by the belief that “once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world” (Menary, 2010 : 39).

Bibliography

Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. 2016, "The Extended Mind: The Journal of Solution Focus in Organizations The Journal of Solution Focus in Organizations", InterAction, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 48-64.

Menary et al, The Extended Mind 2010, MIT Press, Cambridge. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. Accessed: 25 March 2020

Shapiro, L., 2014, The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, Shapiro L., London & New York, Routledge

Wilson, Robert A. and Foglia, Lucia, "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/>. Accessed: 2 April 2020

Clark, A. 2011, "Finding the Mind", Philosophical Studies, vol. 152, no. 3, pp. 447-461.

Wilson, R., 2010, Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems, Oxford Scholarship Online